Country Profile: the historical context surrounding Myanmar’s coup
One month after the military staged a successful coup and declared a yearlong state of emergency, we take a look at the history of Myanmar.
A month ago, on the 1st February 2021, as the democratically elected Assembly of the Union prepared to meet, the military of Myanmar seized control over the country in a coup d’etat over allegations of ‘electoral fraud’, leading to condemnation by world leaders and fears of further civil strife in an already war-torn country.
This report aims to detail the history of Myanmar and establish an understanding of the various factions present in the country, in order to predict how the recent coup may affect the security landscape of Myanmar and Southeast Asia as a whole.
Overview
Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a nation situated in Southeast Asia with a population of around 54 million people, the majority of whom are ethnic Bamar and follow Buddhism. However, the population of Myanmar also includes many different ethnic groups, which has led to numerous civil wars and insurrections.
It is from these conflicts that the Rohingya genocide has been able to occur, with government fighting in the western state of Rakhine, also known as Arakan, leading to a mass exodus of Rohingya refugees, many of whom find themselves in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
In 2015, the election of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) was seen by the international community as a chance for Myanmar to move forward with democratic and economic reforms, as well as an opportunity for peace.
These hopes have not been met, however, and the country continues to struggle with a series of critical issues including violent ethnic conflict, international drug trafficking, COVID-19, and most recently the coup which has seen the NLD removed from power.
In this report, we will be examining the background of Myanmar, and how its history shaped the situation that the country faces today. After this, we will examine the various factions present, looking at their goals and tactics, before moving on to how the situation in Myanmar affects its immediate neighbours.
With this analysis, we can predict some possible outcomes of the troubles in Myanmar and review the impacts this will have on neighbouring nations and businesses operating in the region.
The Modern History of Myanmar
Like many nations in the region, Myanmar found itself at war against the British Empire, losing the conflict and being made a province of British India in 1886. The nation, known officially then as Burma, remained in British hands until the Second World War, when Japanese forces successfully invaded. It was during the Japanese invasion that an effective Burmese liberation movement was formed, with the Japanese falsely promising that they would grant Burma independence if local rebels helped fight the British. Despite this, the British retook the country after a prolonged campaign that did not end until after the war in Europe.
In the post-War world, and with attitudes towards colonialism having shifted, Burma was granted independence in 1948 and refused to join the newly formed Commonwealth of Nations as a result of strong anti-British sentiment. However, the country immediately faced a wave of insurgencies, coup d’etats, and communist uprisings, all of which severely hindered its economic and democratic development, and further led to a rise in ethnic conflicts.
The military of Myanmar, known as the ‘Tatmadaw’, had complete rule over the nation through the turbulence from 1962 to 2011, but still retained significant political influence after the introduction of democratic elections. In 2016, after decades of military rule and significant violence, Nobel Peace Prize winning-Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) were elected to power, and Aung San Suu Kyi was permitted to take up the title of State Counsellor despite having first won a general election in 1990, with the military having previously refused to hand over power.
However, the international community has condemned the civilian government of Myanmar due to the Rohingya genocide, with government forces being accused of attacking villages in Rakhine State and conducting atrocities against the civilian population, which consists largely of Rohingya Muslims. These atrocities have led to further insurgencies and the rise of numerous rebel groups, which we will now explore in greater detail, as well as the mass exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries.
The Factions Present Within Myanmar
The Civilian Government, NLD, and Aung San Suu Kyi
As demonstrated by the February coup, the civilian government of Myanmar and the military should not be considered as a singular entity, and as such we must distinguish the differences between the two. While the military had been in effective control of all elements of Myanmar’s government until 2016, the election of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi changed this, to an extent. Having won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 “for her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights” and having repeatedly been placed under house arrest by military governments, Aung San Suu Kyi was perceived as a force for modernisation and democratisation for Myanmar. She has been outspoken about the continued influence of the military in Myanmar’s politics, criticising the system in which the ‘Tatmadaw’ appoint 25% of representatives to legislative bodies and condemning the use of violence to resolve political disputes, describing it as “barbarism”.
The NLD’s 2020 manifesto focused on three main ideas: establishing internal peace and a redress of ethnic grievances; sustainable development; and further democratisation. The push for democratisation led to tension between the NLD and ‘Tatmadaw’ during Aung San Suu Kyi’s first term in office, with the military refusing to allow Parliament to amend the Constitution, while the NLD refused to summon the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which is primarily controlled by the military, in order to discuss national issues. With the NLD’s landslide victory in the 2020 election, the NLD would have been able to continue with their programme of democratisation and reducing the role of the military in political affairs, prompting the ‘Tatmadaw’ to seize power before Parliament could assemble.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD’s election victory is all the more impressive considering some of the criticisms they faced during their first term in power, most notably in relation to the Rohingya genocide and accusations of being too supportive of the ‘Tatmadaw’. In particular, her defence of the government and military in The Hague when accused of genocide against Rohingya Muslims was described as “a jarring turnabout” and “a rapid fall from grace” by some in the international community.
Despite the damage to her international reputation, these criticisms did little to affect Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity amongst the electorate in Myanmar, as demonstrated by the election results. While opposition parties such as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) refused to accept the result on the grounds of ‘electoral fraud’, little evidence for such fraud was provided, and her popularity should be considered genuine. However, some of the other criticisms of the electoral process should be considered as being accurate, including the widespread disenfranchisement of voters from minority ethnic groups and conflict-ridden areas such as Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin State, which may have assisted the NLD with their electoral victory.
The Military (‘Tatmadaw’):
Having looked at the NLD and the civilian element of Myanmar’s government, we must now consider the role of the ‘Tatmadaw’ both politically and militarily. Politically, the ‘Tatmadaw’ back the USDP, which is seen as the spiritual successor to the previous military junta and whose membership include large numbers of former military personnel.
The USDP performed poorly in both the 2015 and 2020 elections, with the USDP claiming that it had lost due to widespread electoral fraud in 2020. Ideologically the USDP has been described as ultra-nationalist, pro-military, and Buddhist extremist, with this description being similar to the ideology of the ‘Tatmadaw’ itself. This becomes clear when reviewing the “Three Main Causes” of the ‘Tatmadaw’. These are the “non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty”. Politically, such goals are expressed through the military’s support for an ultra-nationalist partly like the USDP.
As for the combat role of the military, the ‘Tatmadaw’ are involved in counter-insurgency operations across the country in an attempt to crush various secessionist movements, which again aligns with their “Three Main Causes”. Equipment and tactics used by the military include mortars, artillery, air strikes, and the deployment of river vessels and infantry against towns and villages with suspected rebel bases. It was also claimed that the military used chemical weapons in Paletwa township in March 2020 after local residents suffered suspicious symptoms.
There have been numerous cases where infantry forces have been reported razing villages suspected of hosting rebels, and of committing atrocities against the civilian population, particularly against Rohingya Muslims. These reported atrocities include rape, kidnapping, and killing unarmed civilians, although such reports are often dismissed by the ‘Tatmadaw’ as being fabrications or wrongly attributed.
Arakan Army (AA):
Consisting mainly of ethnic Rakhine, also known as Arakanese, the AA operate out of the western State of Rakhine and southern Chin State, near the border with Bangladesh. Their aims include greater self-determination for the Arakanese people, and have been involved in a prolonged insurgency against the Myanmar military. However, recent weeks have seen a significant shift in attitude within the Arakan Army, with reports of peace talks occurring with the military and a significant reduction in violent clashes occurring in the region where the Arakan Army operate. While a long-lasting ceasefire or peace agreement would open up the region for investment and tourism, the coup has cast doubts on the legitimacy of promises made by the ‘Tatmadaw’, and future outbreaks of violence are possible, even if peace between the AA and Myanmar military has so far been maintained.
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA):
With a membership consisting of Rohingya Muslims, ARSA has been accused by some of being an Islamist terrorist group, and has been designated such by both Myanmar and Malaysia. Its primary aim is to protect Rohingya Muslims from persecution, and operates out of Rakhine State, on the border of Bangladesh. Tactics used include attacking border guards and police stations, while the group have also been reported as conducting some operations from the Cox’s Bazar region of Bangladesh. While it operates in similar territory to the AA, there does not appear to be any formal relation between the two factions, and ARSA continues to fight against the Myanmar military.
Kachin Independence Army (KIA):
Operating in the north-east of Myanmar, near the border with China’s Yunnan Province, KIA is the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). Consisting mostly of ethnic Kachin, KIA has existed for over 50 years. KIA maintains a close alliance with the AA and has similar aims. However, unlike the Arakan Army, tensions between KIA and the military has escalated since the 2020 election, with no immediate signs of a foundation for a peace deal being present. A temporary ceasefire agreement had been reached in mid-2020 in order to better handle the impacts of COVID-19, but this appears to have broken down. Tactics used by KIA include the deployment of light infantry and engaging in skirmishes against government forces, although they have also been accused of abducting local labourers in Kutkai.
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA):
The TNLA fight in the northern area of Shan State, near the border with China, and seek self-determination for the Ta’ang/ Palaung people. The TNLA frequently clash with ‘Tatmadaw’ forces and factions including the RCSS. TNLA forces use small arms as well as explosive weapons, while efforts to combat opium production in the areas controlled by the TNLA have included attacking militia-controlled plantations. However, the TNLA have also been thought to have engaged in criminal activity such as kidnappings and extortion in areas including Mogok and Kutkai.
Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS):
Based across Shan State, RCSS troops have infrequently clashed with government forces as well as other factions, such as the TNLA, over territory disputes. The majority of clashes involving the RCSS occur on the northern boundary of their territory against the TNLA, which has led to several villages being evacuated and a rise in the number of refugees in the area. Since the coup of 2021, the RCSS has been involved in skirmishes against the Myanmar Military and TNLA in Kyaukme and Hsipaw Townships.
Karen National Union (KNU)/Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA):
The KNU is a political organisation that seeks to advance and represent the Karen people of Myanmar, with the KNLA acting as its military wing. The KNU/KNLA has been involved in armed insurgencies since the early days of Myanmar’s independence in the late 1940s. Based along the border with Thailand, their main goal has changed from seeking an independent Karen state to desiring the establishment of a more federal political system in Myanmar which would advance the interests of minority groups.
Having signed a ceasefire agreement with the government, there are fewer clashes against the ‘Tatmadaw’, but significant outbursts of fighting still occur. In particular, at least 20 clashes were reported in the first two weeks of 2021 near Hpapun and mortar strikes against villages in the north of Karen State have seen local villagers forced to flee. Overall, however, their territory is usually one of the more peaceful areas within Myanmar.
United Wa State Army (UWSA):
Formed out of the military wing of the Communist Party of Burma, the UWSA consists of ethnic Wa troops and supports a Maoist ideology. The UWSA rule over the self-declared ‘Wa State Government Special Administrative Region’, which while not formally recognised by the government of Myanmar has been afforded de facto independence after a peace treaty was signed between the government and the UWSA. The UWSA has been involved in clashes against other militias, insurgent groups, and drug traffickers in the region, and has received support from Chinese authorities including the sale of a nonmilitary helicopter.
The Impact of Instability on Myanmar’s Neighbours
Bangladesh:
The primary and most reported impact that the conflict within Myanmar has on Bangladesh is the mass migration of Rohingya refugees fleeing from persecution and conflict. These refugees hold strong negative views towards the ‘Tatmadaw’, NLD, and Aung San Suu Kyi, with many having reportedly condemned the coup d’etat but expressed little sympathy for Aung San Suu Kyi, who they perceive as having abandoned the Rohingya. Bangladesh responded to this influx of refugees with the construction of large refugee camps in the Cox’s Bazar region, although conditions within the camp are poor, as seen by the recent fire at the Nayapara which destroyed over 500 houses and left over 30 people injured, and violent incidents are sometimes reported at the camps. The government has attempted to deal with the poor conditions within the refugee camps as seen by the construction of a new refugee camp at Bhasan Char, with thousands of refugees already relocated to the island, although some campaign groups have raised concerns over how the refugees were forced to relocate. While the government of Bangladesh has expressed significant concerns over the coup in Myanmar and the possibility of future unrest the ‘Tatmadaw’ has claimed that it will continue with its plan of repatriating Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh. This repatriation programme is key for the government in Dhaka, who will hope to maintain reasonably cordial relations with the ‘Tatmadaw’ in order to ensure the repatriation programme can be enacted, although it is unclear whether many refugees will agree to return to Myanmar amidst the current unrest.
A secondary impact of the war in Myanmar and instability in the border region is the high levels of cross-border crime, particularly in regards to drug trafficking. The drug most commonly smuggled across the border from Myanmar to Bangladesh is yaba (a synthetic mix of methamphetamine and caffeine), with traffickers frequently engaging in gunfights with border guards and police, many of which end fatally. However, drugs which are successfully smuggled past the border region are able to make their way further into the country to major cities such as Chattogram, Dhaka, and towns close to the Indian border.
Thailand:
The impacts of the conflict in Myanmar on Thailand are similar to those faced by Bangladesh, albeit on a lesser scale. In regards to refugees and illegal migration, a large number of incidents involving small groups of Myanmar citizens crossing the border illegally have been reported across Thailand. These groups are often found being escorted by Thai guides or traffickers, who are paid to help the illegal migrants make the crossing. Furthermore, there have been cases of Chinese nationals being caught illegally entering Thailand via Myanmar, with the instability likely making such journeys easier than attempting to directly cross the Thai-Chinese border illegally. However, there have also been large numbers of refugees who have fled the fighting in lands near the border, such as ethnic Mon groups fleeing southeast Myanmar and some Rohingya refugees. When referring to drug trafficking, Myanmar nationals have been caught smuggling illicit goods including kratom leaves (a plant with opioid properties), methamphetamine, yaba, and amphetamine (speed), as well as other goods such as rice. From Thailand, these drugs are able to travel across southeast Asia and be consumed by the local population or be further transported.
In regards to the coup d’etat, the Thai government has been largely silent, regarding the current crisis in Myanmar as a domestic issue. This position stems from Thailand’s strong relationship with the Myanmar military and the fact that Thailand itself has been struggling with a large pro-democracy protest movement who oppose the Thai military’s influence over domestic politics. While large crowds of pro-democracy protesters have demonstrated in the streets of Bangkok to express anger towards the coup in Myanmar, the government itself is unlikely to apply much pressure to the ‘Tatmadaw’ and instead focus on issues of mutual defence and ensuring border security is maintained.
Malaysia:
Significant numbers of Rohingya refugees have been intercepted by the Malaysian military travelling by boat in an attempt to escape the conflict in Myanmar. Many have been turned back by the authorities near Langkawi Island, with the government defending its actions by stating that the refugees may have been infected with COVID-19. There have been large numbers of drug trafficking incidents across the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, with the drugs being transported both by land and sea. However, it is unclear as to the extent of which these drugs may have originated from Myanmar, with many suspected traffickers arrested being Thai nationals.
With the outbreak of the coup d’etat in Myanmar, Malaysia joined its fellow ASEAN member states and neighbours, Singapore and Indonesia, in condemning the ‘Tatmadaw’ and calling for a return to ‘normalcy’. However, neither Malaysia nor its closest political allies have made any strong moves to punish the ‘Tatmadaw’, and the political mechanisms of the bloc mean that it is unlikely that they will provide a unified response to the military government or force it to relinquish power. The established need for consensus in ASEAN decisions means that even if some member states like Malaysia wish to condemn the ‘Tatmadaw’, a bloc decision can be stopped by nations like Thailand who are less opposed to the military regime.
China:
The instability in Myanmar mainly affects China through facilitating drug trafficking. The conflict has allowed large quantities of drugs including heroin, methamphetamine and opium to be produced and transported to the border across the border, with large numbers of drugs seized in the south-western Chinese provinces of Yunnan. China has also, on occasion, been forced to deploy military units to the border out of concern of clashes within Myanmar. However, the Chinese government has also been found to have assisted some of the factions fighting within Myanmar, with examples including the sale of civilian model helicopters and firearms to the United Wa State Army.
It is also important to note that China has responded to the coup d’etat in a significantly different way to most other states in the region, having blocked a United Nations Security Council resolution to condemn the ‘Tatmadaw’ on the grounds that international pressure would lead to an escalation of violence in Myanmar. However, China had invested around USD 21.5 billion into developing infrastructure inside Myanmar, including a deep-sea port, mines, as well as oil and gas pipelines, as part of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Concerns have been raised that the ‘Tatmadaw’ could be harder to work with compared to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, with whom China had a positive relationship, and that Chinese investments could now be threatened by the instability.
Future Predictions
While it is impossible to accurately judge all the consequences of the recent coup and the ongoing internal strife, there are some impacts which are more likely to now occur. For one, the various insurgent groups such as the ARSA and KIA who have continued to fight against the ‘Tatmadaw’ are unlikely to sign a peace agreement in the aftermath of the coup, which has raised the issue of the Myanmar military being untrustworthy.
Meanwhile, groups such as the AA who had begun to reduce hostilities against the ‘Tatmadaw’ may begin to fight again if they see an opportunity to further their goals or if the military become increasingly hostile towards civilians. Notably, the large numbers of voters who had expressed support for the NLD in the traditionally stable parts of the country, centred on Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon, have already started to protest and engage in acts of civil disobedience in the aftermath of the coup. As these protests escalate and become increasingly violent, with both the military and police responding with lethal force, it leaves very few parts of the country unaffected by conflict or unrest. Consequently, the ‘Tatmadaw’ is having to spread its forces far and wide in an attempt to maintain control of the major cities while also suppressing the various insurgencies in the country’s border regions. As such, groups such at the UWSA who are supportive of the ‘Tatmadaw’ are becoming even more important in maintaining stability in their respective regions.
In regards to the international implications of the unrest, foreign investors and businesses are left with very few opportunities to conduct business inside Myanmar safely, while members of the press have already reported being assaulted by pro-military protesters or arrested by the security services. The loss of such investment may lead to a deterioration of Myanmar’s economy and consequently affect the standard of living of its residents, with such an outcome also being possible if major sanctions are placed on Myanmar by nations critical of the ‘Tatmadaw’. If so, it would be highly likely that more residents of Myanmar would either require foreign aid or would try to migrate to neighbouring countries including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, or China, with the movement of people also allowing for the spread of COVID-19.
Domestically, Myanmar’s fight against COVID-19 is facing a delay, with the military focusing on maintaining order and governing, as well as preparing to hold a second “free and fair” general election, the outcome of which will likely be that the USDP gain significantly more seats and that the military’s role in government is further cemented in the Constitution.
Intelligence Fusion warned users of a potential coup in Myanmar almost a week before the military takeover hit headlines across the world. Our analysts picked up on the possibility of a coup d’état in Myanmar six days before it happened during their monitoring of local media sources. To take a closer look at the data that helps organisations such as Credit Suisse, BASF and the United Nations better protect their people, assets and operations, schedule your free trial of Intelligence Fusion.
REPORT WRITTEN BY:
Chris Bowe
Regional Intelligence Analyst
Intelligence Fusion is a threat intelligence data and software provider specialising in actionable intelligence and custom solutions to help global security leaders better protect their people, assets and reputations.
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